Quid Pro Quo Foreign Investment by Bhagwati, Jagdish N. et al.
INTERNATIONAL FACTOR MOBILITY: NEWISSUESt 
Quid Pro Quo Foreign Investment 
By JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, ELIAS DINOPOULOS, AND KAR-YIU WONG* 
The theory of international trade took off 
in two major directions in the 1980's. First, 
while the 1950's through the 1970's had 
witnessed major developments in the theo- 
retical analysis of factor market imperfec- 
tions, the 1980's were marked by the 
theoretical exploration of product market 
imperfections. The latter effectively imple- 
mented, in the sphere of trade, the agenda 
that the classic works of Edward Chamber- 
lin and Joan Robinson on monopolistic 
competition and imperfect competition had 
set before the profession more generally in 
the 1930's. 
Second, trade theorists participated in pi- 
oneering the revolutionary shift in economic 
theorizing that has brought political pro- 
cesses explicitly into the analysis of eco- 
nomic phenomena and policy. Among the 
important early theoretical developments 
were the analysis of directly unproductive 
profit-seeking (DUP) and rent-seeking ac- 
tivities by Anne 0. Krueger (1974) and 
Bhagwati (1982) and a variety of endoge- 
nous-tariff models.1 
The political-economy-theoretic reformu- 
lation and explanation of the classic ques- 
tions of international economics continue to 
grow apace. This is manifest also in the 
theory of direct foreign investment (DFI), 
which has recently been refocused so as to 
include explicitly the fact that the policy 
framework in the host country can be en- 
dogenous to the direct foreign investment in 
ways that needed to be formally incorpo- 
rated in the positive and normative analysis 
of DFI. 
In particular, one can identify a novel 
form of DFI in which it occurs at a loss in 
period 1 (from the viewpoint of myopic 
one-period profit maximization), with a view 
to (endogenously) defusing the threat of 
protection in period 2, therefore maximizing 
the two-period payoff from the interlinked 
decisions on trade and investment. In Bhag- 
wati (1985) where this possibility was identi- 
fied, the phenomenon was christened "quid 
pro quo DFI" because the quid pro quo for 
a DFI incurring a first-period loss is the 
improvement in the expected second-period 
payoff from the increased probability of 
keeping the export market open in period 2. 
I. Alternative Possibilities 
The classic case of tariff-induced DFI oc- 
curs when the tariff (or quota) is exoge- 
nously specified and tariff-jumping invest- 
ment occurs. Quid pro quo DFI, by 
contrast, occurs as an attempt to reduce the 
probability of protection being successfully 
imposed: it is tariff-defusing. How does such 
defusion of the threat of protection arise? 
Casual empiricism readily suggests alter- 
native possibilities. Consider the following 
economic agents in the home country 
(Japan) and the host country (United 
States): 
Japan (home country) 
Firms Government 
United States (host country) 
Firms Labor Commun overnment 
unions 
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With DFI from Japan into the United States 
at issue and the threat of protection (say, 
voluntary export restraints [VER's]) in the 
United States against Japan in response to 
Japanese export success a perceived danger, 
quid pro quo DFI can arise in several ways. 
For instance, consider the following. 
1. The Japanese government may encour- 
age DFI in the United States with a view to 
buying goodwill from the U.S. government 
and reducing the probability that it will grant 
protection to the lobbies seeking it. There- 
fore, this route operates through the "supply 
of protection" in the United States. 
2. In oligopolistic industries where the 
quid pro quo in terms of the enhanced 
probability of maintaining market access will 
accrue to the firms themselves, the incentive 
to undertake such quid pro quo DFI obtains 
at the firm-level itself. 
3. Again, in both cases, the quid pro quo 
may operate, not through affecting the sup- 
ply of protection in the United States, but 
through affecting the "demand for protec- 
tion" by the economic agents in the United 
States: 
(i) The quid pro quo DFI may co-opt the 
U.S. firms that seek to lobby for protec- 
tion against Japanese rivals. For exam- 
ple, the Toyota-General Motors joint 
venture in 1984 was followed by Gen- 
eral Motors breaking ranks in 1985 
when the rest of the auto industry 
sought renewal of the VER restraint on 
Japanese autos. 
(ii) Alternatively, the quid pro quo DFI 
may coopt the labor unions and weaken 
their incentive to lobby for protection 
to "save jobs."2 
(iii) Equally, by setting up such DFI, the 
Japanese government or investor may 
seek to develop countervailing "anti- 
Japan-bashing" lobbies at the level of 
the communities that obtain visible, di- 
rect benefit from the DFI. This would 
also help to contain the protectionist 
threat against Japan. 
These different possibilities have in com- 
mon the postulate that, through one kind of 
political process or another, the quid pro 
quo investments lead to a linkage between 
first-period and second-period profitability 
from trade and investment. However, each 
possibility generates its own model. 
From an analytical point of view, the 
models can be divided into three categories: 
(i) those that use perfectly competitive mar- 
ket structures and those that use oligopolis- 
tic market structures; (ii) those that model 
the (Japanese) government as the agent de- 
ciding on the investment and those that 
focus on the (Japanese) firm's decision in- 
stead; and (iii) those that treat the probabil- 
ity of the (U.S.) government imposing pro- 
tection as specified exogenously as simply a 
function of the DFI and those that deter- 
mine it endogenously from the utility-maxi- 
mizing behavior of the lobbying agents (in 
the United States). 
Evidently, the choice of assumptions 
within each of these three categories can 
entail compatible choices in others. Thus, if 
the analyst uses the perfectly competitive 
model, the agents deciding on the quid pro 
quo DFI cannot be atomistic firms, which 
do not behave strategically; however, the 
protectionist threat could be modeled either 
exogenously or endogenously. 
The existing theoretical analyses of quid 
pro quo DFI exhibit a considerable diversity 
of approaches. They not only develop the 
positive (i.e., explanatory) theory of quid 
pro quo DFI; they also examine its welfare 
implications. However, whereas the focus of 
the tariff-jumping welfare-theoretic analyses 
has been on the impact on the host country 
(since the analysis was motivated by tariff 
policies in developing countries designed to 
attract such tariff-jumping investments), the 
welfare-theoretic analysis of the tariff- 
defusing quid pro quo models began with 
the impact on the home country (Bhagwati 
et al., 1987) and have only subsequently 
been extended to the impact on the host 
country (Dinopoulos and Wong, 1991). 
2Given the insider-outsider problem, this type of 
quid pro quo DFI is likely to arise only when the 
beneficiaries are members of the same union as those 
who are threatened with layoffs due to the protection- 
ist threat. 
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The formal analysis of quid pro quo DFI 
was first undertaken by Bhagwati et al. 
(1987), who used the general equilibrium 
2x2x2 model of trade theory. This model 
had been utilized earlier by Bhagwati and 
T. N. Srinivasan (1976) to analyze the opti- 
mal policy for a country in regard to its 
current trade if the proposed policy affects 
the probability of trade restrictions being 
invoked later by the other country. In a 
generalization of that analysis, Bhagwati 
et al. (1987) analyzed the optimal policy in 
regard to trade and DFI abroad if exports 
and DFI now were both to affect the proba- 
bility of trade restrictions being invoked by 
the other country later. 
Their analysis therefore produced an ar- 
gument for intervention to encourage quid 
pro quo capital outflow, while the firm-level 
outflows were determined entirely by atom- 
istic, myopic firms. The model reflected, 
though in a deeper way, the presumed en- 
couragement being provided by the 
Japanese government to firms to invest 
abroad. 
The oligopolistic case in which a firm 
itself will undertake quid pro quo DFI, 
"overinvesting" in period 1 so as to maxi- 
mize two-period profits by defusing the 
threat of protection, was analyzed in 
Dinopoulos and Bhagwati (1986) and 
Dinopoulos (1989).3 Dinopoulos also con- 
sidered the free-rider problem (as when 
Toyota undertakes DFI in the United States 
and the quid pro quo benefits accrue equally 
to Nissan, which does not), showing that the 
quid pro quo DFI level varies inversely with 
the number of firms in the investing coun- 
try. 
Despite the key differences noted above, 
the Bhagwati et al. (1987) analysis and the 
analyses of Dinopoulos and Bhagwati (1986) 
and Dinopoulos (1989) shared one critical 
assumption: the protectionist threat was 
specified as a function of the first-period 
DFI, exogenous to any specific "lobbying" 
activity.4 The view was that the mere act of 
DFI would serve to reduce the threat by 
earning goodwill. A grateful community in 
the area of investment perhaps might pro- 
vide the political counterweight to protec- 
tionism via their Congressmen. 
However, the active lobbying is often by 
firms and labor under the threat of import 
competition. To model that, one needs to 
"endogenize" the threat function. Wong 
(1989a) proceeded to do that by introducing 
unemployment (assuming a minimum wage) 
and a labor union that would lobby for 
protection from imports. Given the fixed 
wage, for any level of DFI, protection will 
raise the product price and hence reduce 
unemployment. The union is then assumed 
to lobby for the full-employment-generating 
protection, and the probability of obtaining 
protection increases with lobbying resources 
spent. Thus, the expected level of protec- 
tion becomes a function of lobbying and 
DFI.s As with previous analyses, the host- 
country government behavior is not explic- 
itly modeled (this restriction being removed 
in subsequent analysis by Dinopoulos [1992], 
who models bargaining among the foreign 
firm undertaking the DFI, the home-coun- 
try union, and the home-country govern- 
ment). It is then easy to see that quid pro 
quo DFI can arise in this model. 
The welfare economics of quid pro quo 
DFI in Wong's model have been analyzed 
in Dinopoulos and Wong (1991). Following 
the generalized theory of distortions and 
policy intervention and focusing primarily 
on host-country welfare rather than on 
home-country welfare (as in Bhagwati et al. 
[1987]), the authors argue that the fixed- 
wage distortion can be removed at the 
source as the first-best policy for the host 
country (assuming, of course, that there are 
no other distortions to be remedied). It is 
3Dinopoulos (1989) did not consider optimal policy 
intervention, but it is evident that the oligopolistic 
firm-determined quid pro quo investment will not gen- 
erally be welfare-maximizing for the home or the host 
country. 
4Thus, Bhagwati et al. (1987) worked with the prob- 
ability (of a quota being invoked) function G = 
G(E', K'), where G, > O and G2 < 0, with El being 
the period-1 exports and K' being the period-1 DFI 
by the home country. 
5In a later paper, Laixun Zhao (1991) endogenizes 
the wage as well. 
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then shown that, as a second-best policy, a 
production subsidy does better than restric- 
tions on DFI inflow or "counterlobbying" 
by the host government. 
II. The Evidence for Quid Pro Quo DFI 
Economic theorizing often proceeds from 
casual empiricism. The theorizing of the 
quid pro quo DFI phenomenon is no excep- 
tion (Bhagwati, 1990). However, there is 
certainly some plausible, more-than-anec- 
dotal evidence that the acceleration in 
Japanese DFI in the United States in the 
early 1980's was due to a mix of "political" 
reasons: some partly in anticipation of the 
imposition of protection, and others partly 
to defuse its threat. Thus, in a survey of 
Japanese firms undertaking foreign invest- 
ment between 1980 and 1986, the ministry 
of International Trade and Investment 
(MITI) found that the overwhelming major- 
ity of firms cited "avoiding trade friction" as 
their main motivation (Bhagwati, 1990; see 
also Wong [1989b]). 
Of course, the calculation of the quid pro 
quo investors may turn out to be invalid. 
Thus, the DFI may create ill will rather 
than goodwill. In the case of Japanese DFI 
in the United States, there has been some 
backlash, and it is perceived by some now as 
a threat as well. Then again, there have 
been demands (by Lee Iacocca, for in- 
stance) to add the Japanese DFI production 
to the Japanese exports in enforcing VER 
limits. If this is done, it would of course 
tend to frustrate the quid pro quo investors' 
intention to invest so as to maintain export 
market access. 
III. Other Political-Economy-Theoretic 
DFI Possibilities 
The distinguishing feature of quid pro 
quo DFI is the economic exploitation of the 
political linkage between the investment and 
the formulation of trade policy; but then 
other such linkages can be found. Thus, in 
1981, MITI allocated over 70 percent of the 
U.S. VER to Toyota, Nissan, and Honda, 
allocating the rest to Mitsubishi, Mazda, 
Fuji, Isuzu, and Suzuki (H. Shibata, 1990). 
Subsequently, American manufacturers in- 
vested in these suppliers (e.g., Ford ac- 
quired 24.41 percent of Mazda's stock, and 
General Motors acquired 5 percent of 
Suzuki's stock. By pressuring MITI to in- 
crease these firms' quotas (i.e., by therefore 
endogenously determining their quota allo- 
cations in Japan), these American manufac- 
turers appear to have made their DFI 
profitable. James G. Benedict (1992) has 
therefore proposed that a rent-extracting 
VER-induced DFI could occur in the 
VER-restrained country whenever the firms 
in the VER-imposing country have the clout 
in the VER-restrained country to lobby for 
a greater share (of the quota) to be allotted 
to their partners. 
In the future, the theory of DFI will be 
extended to this and other possibilities, in 
addition to further developments in the the- 
ory of quid pro quo DFI, supplementing the 
conventional politics-free approaches to the 
theory of DFI. 
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